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One consequence of Donald Trump’s November 2016 election as
president, both his friends and foes might agree, is that his administration
has gotten people thinking (and talking and writing) about the
Constitution, including provisions that previously languished in obscurity.
No example better illustrates this phenomenon than the Constitution’s
previously all but forgotten prohibitions on presidential receipt of
“Emolument[s]” from foreign powers, 1 “the United States, or any of
them.” 2
As we detail below, to date three lawsuits have claimed that President
Trump is guilty of innumerable, continuing violations of these
prohibitions. While the complaints in these cases devote many words to
describing the alleged unconstitutional conduct, they are surprisingly
laconic and vague on what relief would be appropriate were the plaintiffs
to prevail. This brief essay evaluates a constructive trust as a remedy.
We first treat, admittedly in a most cursory fashion, the merits issues
(as opposed to procedural issues) raised in the pending suits. Then, we
promptly pivot to a discussion of the doctrines governing imposition of a
constructive trust, first in the context of private fiduciary relationships,
and later as a response to government officials’ breaches of duties owed
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1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7
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to the public. Drawing on the rationale underlying the application of the
constructive trust in these contexts, we argue that a court, in the exercise
of its equitable jurisdiction, would be justified in finding that the violation
of the Foreign Emoluments Clauses by a sitting President creates a
constructive trust for the benefit of the public treasury when the violation
yields personal profit or gain to the President, even if such profit does not
result in financial loss to the United States.
I. THE MERITS, BRIEFLY
Though Benjamin Franklin’s receipt of a jewel-encrusted snuff box
from the King of France often gets the credit, 3 the concept, and much of
the language, of the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause 4 pre-dates
that much ballyhooed embarrassment. Article VI of the Articles of
Confederation anticipated the Constitution in prohibiting “any person
holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of
them” from accepting “any present, emolument, office or title” from any
foreign sovereign or state. 5 Employing nearly identical language, the
Constitution’s Article I, section 9 commands:
[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under [the United
States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King,
Prince or foreign State. 6

The provision’s purpose is self-evident: U.S. officeholders ought not to
be beholden to foreign powers. And for two centuries, the clause was
virtually self-enforcing. The encyclopedic The Constitution of the United

3. Edmund Randolph, a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention, later invoked the example
of Franklin, without naming him, in recounting the Convention’s adoption of the Foreign Emoluments
Clause. See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION
OF
THE
FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION
465–66
(2d
ed.
1891)
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/elliot-the-debates-in-the-several-state-conventions-vol-3
[https://perma.cc/83Q3-X6HN].
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. Article I, section 6 of the Constitution forbids the appointment
of any Senator or Representative to any civil office “the Emoluments whereof shall have been
increased” during the term for which he or she was elected. Moreover, after securing to the President
a salary “which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have
been elected,” Article II of the Constitution prohibits “within that Period any other Emolument from
the United States, or any of them.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. Though some of the suits against
the President assert violations of both the Article II provision and the Foreign Emoluments Clause,
we focus solely on the latter, both in the interest of brevity and because the claimed violations of the
Foreign Emoluments Clause present most starkly the question of presidential loyalty explored herein.
5. Articles of Confederation, art. VI, § 1.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
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States: Analysis and Interpretation indicates that the Foreign Emoluments
Clause is one of the very few provisions of the Constitution for which
there are no Supreme Court rulings to report. 7
That may soon change. In 2017, no fewer than three separate lawsuits
were filed in federal courts alleging that President Trump’s on-going
business arrangements violate both the Foreign and the Domestic
Emoluments clauses. The first, filed on January 23 in the Southern District
of New York by Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington
(CREW), 8 alleges (among other things) that President Trump’s on-going
involvement with, and enrichment from, his numerous U.S. and foreign
rental and hospitality properties’ dealings with the foreign governments,
their representatives, and the entities they own and control, all violate the
prohibition of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. 9 In addition to seeking a
judicial declaration to this effect, the only other remedy sought is an
injunction ordering the President to cease “violating the Foreign . . .
Emoluments Clause, as construed by [the district court],” and “to release
financial records sufficient to confirm” his compliance with the court’s
order. 10
In June, the Department of Justice moved to dismiss the suit, arguing
that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claimand, in the alternative, that they
lacked Article III standing, that they failed to state an injury within the
Emoluments Clause’s zone of interests, and that, in any event, the Clause
was not implicated by “benefits arising from a President’s private business
pursuits having nothing to do with his office or personal service to a
7. The Constitution of the United States: Analysis and Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 112-9, at
402-03 (2017 ed.) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2017/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2017-92.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBX5-SD3V] (citing no cases). To be sure, innumerable Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel opinions address issues arising under the Clause, but this is in part
what is meant by self-enforcing.
8. Complaint, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 458
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017). The complaint has been twice amended and refiled. See Second Amended
Complaint, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 458 (S.D.N.Y. May 10,
2017).
https://www.sdnyblog.com/files/2017/06/17-Civ.-00458-2017.05.10-Second-AmendedComplaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FSQ-F27C].
9. Second Amended Complaint at para. 7. The complaint also attacks the President’s
continued receipt of “payments from foreign-government-owned broadcasters related to rebroadcasts
and foreign versions of the television program ‘The Apprentice’ and its spinoffs.” Id. The other two
suits are Blumenthal, et al. v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-01154 (D.D.C. filed June 14, 2017)
https://www.theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/Blumenthal_v_Trump_DDC_Original_C
omplaint_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FFP-3HBW]; and District of Columbia & State of Maryland
v.
Trump,
No.
8:17-cv-01596-PJM
(D.Md.
filed
June
12,
2017)
https://ia800101.us.archive.org/13/items/gov.uscourts.mdd.391534/gov.uscourts.mdd.391534.1.0.pd
f [https://perma.cc/6H9C-3SCH]. Although the various lawsuits also claim violations of the Domestic
Emoluments Clause, we limit our discussion here to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.
10. Id. at para. 257 (b).
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foreign power.” 11 After briefing and argument on that motion, the district
court delivered the President an early Christmas present on December 21
by dismissing the suit. The court ruled that none of the plaintiffs had
Article III standing and that, in any event, their complaint sought
resolution of a non-justiciable political question. 12 The court’s present,
however welcome, was also significantly incomplete; the court expressly
declined to address “whether [the] Plaintiffs’ allegations state a cause of
action under either the Domestic or Foreign Emoluments Clauses” as well
as “whether the payments at issue would constitute an emolument
prohibited by either Clause.” 13
In keeping with this symposium’s focus on remedial questions, we
do not express an opinion on either the justiciability or merits issues in
any of the pending cases. Rather, for the sake of argument we assume that
the clause has been violated and consider only the propriety of a
constructive trust as a remedy.
II. THE PRIVATE LAW OF TRUSTS
Within the private law of trusts, a trustee is a person who holds legal
title to property for the benefit of another. However much of a rogue a
person may be in his personal affairs, once he puts on the hat of a trustee,
his conduct becomes subject to the highest of fiduciary standards in all
matters relating to the trust. If he be rogue in that capacity—even a little
or even unwittingly—any breach of the fiduciary standards to which he is
subject that results in his own personal profit may be remedied by judicial
imposition of a constructive trust. 14 A child of equity, the constructive
trust prevents a person from profiting from his wrongful conduct. 15 With

11. Def.’s Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in
Washington v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 458, at 26 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2017) http://guptawessler.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/2017-06-09-35-MTD-Mem.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAY8-FXDW].
12. Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 458, 2017 WL 6524851,
at *1 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2017).
13. Id. An appeal is pending as of this writing. Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v.
Trump, No. 17 Civ. 458, Notice of Appeal, Doc. 105 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2018).
14. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 197 (1937) (“Where a fiduciary in violation of
his duty to the beneficiary receives or retains a . . . profit, he holds what he receives upon a
constructive trust for the beneficiary.”).
15. The constructive trust is based upon “the equitable principle that no one should be
permitted to profit by his own fraud, or take advantage and profit as a result of his own wrong or
crime.” In re Estate of Mahoney, 220 A.2d 475, 477 (Vt. 1966) (citing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188
(N.Y. 1889)).
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deterrence and prevention of faithless conduct as its goal, 16 this remedy
requires the rogue trustee to convey any ill-gotten gains to another,
because allowing the trustee to retain them would unjustly enrich him. 17
To remain on the straight and narrow pathway of fiduciary
righteousness, a trustee must adhere to the following core fiduciary
standards: (1) the duty to administer trustee responsibilities in accordance
with the governing document; (2) the duty of prudence; (3) the duty of
loyalty; (4) the duty of impartiality; and (5) the duty to account and
inform. 18 Our discussion herein primarily concerns the duty of loyalty and
its application to the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Accordingly, we omit
coverage of the remaining fiduciary tenets.
The duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to act solely in the best
interests of the beneficiaries. 19 Consequently, the duty of loyalty includes
a strict prohibition against self-dealing—conduct which entails “the risk
that the fiduciary may be enriched at the expense of the beneficiary.” 20
An errant trustee whose conduct falls short of this fiduciary mandate
is liable to the trust’s beneficiary, 21 who can bring an action against the
trustee to hold him to account for the breach. As atonement for any
wrongful conduct from which the trustee profits or gains financially in his
personal capacity, a court may require the trustee to convey property to
the beneficiary. In other words, a court may find that the trustee holds the
ill-gotten gains on constructive trust in favor of the beneficiary. 22 This is
16. Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 596 (1955) (observing that the goal of equitable remedies
in cases of public trust violations are “always on the fundamental basis of preventing the unfaithful
public official or public body profiting from his or its wrongdoing.”).
17. A Concise Restatement of Donative Transfers and Trusts 458 (Thomas P. Gallanis ed.
2017). See also Restatement (First) of Restitution § 160 (1937); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 1
cmt. e (1959); V.A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 462, at 3413 (3d ed. 1967)).
18. Note that this list is not intended to be exhaustive of the duties of trusteeship. For a fulsome
categorization, see GALLANIS, supra note 17, at 761-813.
19. Id. at 769. “The duty of loyalty is, for trustees, particularly strict even by comparison to the
standards of other fiduciary relationships.” Id., at 770. This fiduciary obligation is one of undivided
loyalty to the beneficiaries and requires the trustee to “subordinate his own interests to the welfare of
the beneficiaries” in all matters pertaining to the trust. Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the
Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1089 (2004) (citing Bogert & Bogert § 543, at 217;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §170 (1959)).
20. Natelson, at 1089; GALLANIS, at 769 (noting that, with certain exceptions, “the trustee is
strictly prohibited from engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing or that otherwise involve or
create a conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary duties and personal interests.”).
21. A trust may have more than one beneficiary. For simplicity, we use the singular form
throughout this paper.
22. “Where a person in a fiduciary relation to another acquires property, and the acquisition or
retention of the property is in violation of his duty as a fiduciary, he holds it upon a constructive trust
for the other.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) ON RESTITUTION § 190 (1937). “Where a fiduciary in violation
of his duty to the beneficiary receives or retains a bonus or commission or other profit, he holds what
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so even when the beneficiary suffers no harm from the trustee’s faithless
conduct. 23
III. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND THE PUBIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Drawing on the private law of trusts, courts have long held public
officials to the same fiduciary standards imposed upon private trustees.
Together, these standards form the core of the public trust doctrine.24 And,
as in the private law of trusts, it is the breach of a fiduciary duty which
serves as the cornerstone for the imposition of a constructive trust when
the breach allows the public official to obtain personal profit or gain. 25 “If
the public can recover from the [corrupt public official] everything he
gained from his misconduct, whether or not the public itself suffered
direct loss, then it has a powerful weapon for protecting itself from its
faithless servants.” 26 In this regard, the constructive trust serves as the
appropriate vehicle both to vindicate the public interest in holding the
corrupt public official to account and to deter other fiduciary offenses. 27
For example, in Jersey City v. Hague, when three city officials
banded together to force city employees to pay over to the officials three
percent of the employees’ salaries in an extortion scheme extending over
a thirty-two year period, the city sued. In determining whether the trial
court had properly granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state claim,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed. The court found the city to be
the real party in interest,28 and the city officials to have held “positions of
public trust,” 29 to have allegedly looted the public till, 30 and to have
violated the fiduciary duties they owed to the public (if the allegations
he receives upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) ON RESTITUTION §
197 (1937). The constructive trust is not a trust in the true sense of the word, but merely a legal term
for the equitable remedy described in this section.
23. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) ON RESTITUTION § 197, cmt. c (1937) (“The rule stated in [§ 197]
is applicable although the profit received by the fiduciary is not at the expense of the beneficiary.”).
24. The basic idea of the public trust doctrine is that “public officials are legally bound to
[adhere to] (appropriately adapted) standards borrowed from the law regulating private fiduciaries.”
Natelson, at 1088.
25. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 197 (1937) (“Where a fiduciary in violation of
his duty to the beneficiary receives or retains a . . . profit, he holds what he receives upon a
constructive trust for the beneficiary.”).
26. Arthur Lenhoff, The Constructive Trust as a Remedy for Corruption in Public Office, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 214, 215 (1954); see also Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 589-91. Here, the term
“corrupt” is not limited solely to a quid pro quo form of bribery, but rather includes other types of
violations of the public trust.
27. Hague, 18 N.J. at 596.
28. Id. at 596.
29. Id. at 589.
30. Id.at 588-89.
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were proven true). 31 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff’s
requested remedy—a constructive trust in favor of the city—was an
appropriate prayer for relief. 32 The court’s decision relied heavily upon
the public trust doctrine. 33 Other examples abound, and courts have
imposed constructive trusts for public-official wrongdoing in myriad
contexts. 34
To the extent that the constructive trust is an appropriate remedy for
a public official’s violation of his fiduciary duties, so too would it be an
appropriate remedy for a federal officeholder’s violation of a
constitutional duty that results in that officeholder’s profit or gain. This is
so, at least in part, because in drafting and ratifying the Constitution, the
Founders applied the tenets of the public trust doctrine, and therefore built
into the constitutional structure the same fiduciary duties as those from
the private law of trusts. 35
IV. THE FIDUCIARY LAW OF THE FOUNDERS
The rogue public official was a well-known character to the
Founders, and they feared, mightily, that a faithless public servant would
be swayed by both foreign and domestic influences to act against the
national interest in exchange for personal gain. This clear-eyed vision of
human nature and the corrupting effects of power gave the Framers a
particularly robust sense of the need to address these risks as they
31. Id. at 589-96.
32. Id. at 596.
33. Id. at 589-91 (“[Public officials] stand in a fiduciary relationship to the people whom they
have been elected or appointed to serve. As fiduciaries and trustees of the public weal they are under
an inescapable obligation to serve the public with the highest fidelity. In discharging the duties of
their office they are required to display such intelligence and skill as they are capable of, to be diligent
and conscientious, to exercise their discretion not arbitrarily but reasonably, and above all to display
good faith, honesty and integrity. They must be impervious to corrupting influences and they must
transact their business frankly and openly in the light of public scrutiny so that the public may know
and be able to judge them and their work fairly. . . . These obligations are not mere theoretical
concepts or idealistic abstractions of no practical force or effect; they are obligations imposed by the
common law on public officers and assumed by them as a matter of law upon their entering public
office.”) (citations omitted). Other cases bear out the notion that the constructive trust is an appropriate
remedy for corruption by public officials, regardless of whether the public till suffers any actual loss.
See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1910) (finding that the imposition of a constructive
trust was the appropriate remedy, even though the Army had not been financially aggrieved and
stating: “The larger interests of public justice will not tolerate, under any circumstances, that a public
official shall retain any profit or advantage which he may realize through the acquirement of an
interest in conflict with his fidelity as an agent.” Id. at 306.).
34. See, e.g., Minneapolis v. Canterbury, 142 N.W. 812 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1913); City of Boston
v. Santosuosso, 10 N.E.2d 271, 274 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1937); Chicago Park Dist. v. Kenroy, Inc.,
402 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1980).
35. Natelson, supra note 19 at 1091.

118

CONLAWNOW

[9:111

undertook the sober and awesome obligation of creating a new form of
government. Their solemn task in this regard benefitted from their
knowledge of, and reverence for, fiduciary tenets. Indeed, at the time of
America’s founding, those who framed and ratified our Constitution
operated within a political and legal context built upon a “fiduciary ideal
of government service” 36—i.e., the concept of a public trust doctrine
applicable to public officials—which formed a core principle of foundingera standards of governance. 37
According to Professor Robert G. Natelson’s extensive study of
founding-era documents, the Founders’ understanding and application of
public trust tenets encompassed the five core fiduciary principles from
private trust law. 38 The Founders were steeped in fiduciary law
principles; 39 they discussed these principles during the drafting and
ratifying debates; 40 and they incorporated mechanisms within the
constitutional structure to ensure that fiduciary standards would be met. 41
The Founders created a structure of government that reflects the
public trust doctrine’s fiduciary norms, in part to ensure that public
36. Id. at 1083.
37. Id. at 1095-1135 (examining founding-era documents and concluding that the “public trust
doctrine seems to have been an ideal that almost everyone agreed on”, Id. at 1137).
38. Id. at 1088-1168 (noting that, although the terminology and foci of emphasis varied, the
core duties permeated both the sources upon which the Founders relied and the language the Founders
themselves used to draft and discuss good principles of governance).
39. See Natelson, at 1077 (noting that the Founders’ political and legal canon was replete with
discussions of public trust and the attendant fiduciary obligations imposed upon public officials);
Complaint, District of Columbia & State of Maryland v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM (D.Md.
filed June 12, 2017) (observing that the Articles of Confederation used the language of trusts in the
predecessor to the Foreign Emoluments Clause in referring to office holders to whom the provision
applied, Id., at 8 (citing ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VI, §1) and that many state
constitutions contained similar provisions which incorporated the language of trusts, Id. at 31-32
(citing MD. CONST. of 1776, art. 33 and 53; PA. CONST., DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE
INHABITANTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OR STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, art. V; S.C. CONST. OF 1776,
art. X; and MASS. CONST. ch. II, art. XIII.)).
40. E.g., James Madison Journal (July 20, 1787), in Max Farrand, 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL
CONVENTION
OF
1787,
at
66
(Max
Farrand
ed.,
1911)
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/farrand-the-records-of-the-federal-convention-of-1787-vol-2
[https://perma.cc/P6BP-F6XG]. (observing that a “chief Magistrate,” left unchecked, would risk
“betray[ing] his trust to foreign powers.”); Letter from Roger Sherman (Dec. 8, 1787), in
SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 286
(James H. Hutson ed., 1987) http://www.consource.org/document/roger-sherman-to-___-1787-12-8/
[https://perma.cc/KZC2-RR4Y] (“In every government there is a trust, which may be abusedFalse”);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that persons elected to office “may
find compensations for betraying their trust. . .”); see also Natelson, at 1077, n. 271 (noting the
frequent use by The Federalist of the terms “public trust,” “guardian,” “guardianship,” “public
servant” (or words of similar import), “trustee”, and “agent”).
41. See Natelson, at 1137-1168 (describing how various provisions of the Constitution
implement core fiduciary standards from the law of trusts).
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officials, including (even especially) the Chief Executive, would be bound
by them. 42 For our purposes, we limit discussion strictly to the duty of
loyalty, which is the duty most heavily implicated by the Foreign
Emoluments Clause. As for that duty, the exclusive, undivided loyalty of
a federal office-holder is in the best interest of the nation. 43 The Framers
incorporated a number of mechanisms to ensure the President’s undivided
loyalty to the American public in the execution of the nation’s laws and
the administration of the nation’s business. 44 To ensure adherence to the
duty of loyalty, the Framers made it more difficult for the President to
succumb to the temptations of foreign corrupt influences by including the
Foreign Emoluments Clause. 45
The duty of loyalty was so central to the Framers’ understanding of
the fiduciary nature of public office that they relied upon it as rationale
for including a provision allowing for the impeachment and removal from
office of a faithless Chief Executive. 46 Remedies beyond the Constitution
also exist. Anti-corruption statutes passed by Congress, for example,
criminalize certain conduct that also entails breaches of the public trust. 47

42. Id. at 1168 (“[O]ne of the Founders’ ‘general purposes’ was to construct a government that
would, to the extent practicable, operate according to certain fiduciary norms.”).
43. Complaint at 16, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00458
(S.D.N.Y.
filed
June
14,
2017)
http://guptawessler.com/wp-content/uploads/
2017/08/MembersofCongress.pdf.
44. Among them are the checks and balances of power invested in the separate branches of
government, designed to make each branch independent from the potential for undue influence of the
others (Natelson, at 1147-48); the prohibition against federal legislators serving in or accepting newlycreated or newly-enhanced executive offices so as to “‘guard[] against the danger of executive
influence upon the legislative body,’” (Id., at 1148 and n. 315 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 and
quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001) http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf); the provision barring changes to
executive compensation during his or her term of office, Id., at 1148 (2004) (citing U.S. CONST. art.
II, §. 1, cl. 7); and the Domestic Emoluments Clause, which was intended to minimize the likelihood
of domestic corruption (U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7).
45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. Other examples of loyalty-infused provisions include a
requirement that only natural-born citizens are eligible to be President (Natelson, at 1148 (citing U.S.
CONST. art. II, §. 1, cl. 5)), and a requirement that, prior to assuming office, the President-elect swear
or affirm loyalty to the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7).
46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. During the Constitutional Convention debates, for example, James
Madison expressed his concerns about the risk of disloyalty in his support for an impeachment
provision:
[I]t [is] indispensable that some provision should be made for defending the Community [against] the
incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service,
[sic] was not a sufficient securityFalse He might pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation
or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers.
James Madison Journal, supra note 40 at 65-66 (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1948); Foreign
Agents Registration Act, 18 U.S.C. § 219 (1939).
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But even when duty-of-loyalty violations do not rise to the level of
criminality, 48 or create the political will to impeach, another potentially
powerful remedy remains for rectifying a rogue President’s wrongdoing.
That remedy is the constructive trust. 49
V. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND THE FOREIGN EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE
In light of the Founders’ reliance on fiduciary principles from trusts
law in drafting and ratifying the Constitution, courts’ use of constructive
trusts as a remedy for breach of those duties by a public official, and the
general acceptance of the public trust doctrine in Anglo-American law,
we now consider how the public trust doctrine operates as justification for
the imposition of a constructive trust when a sitting President violates the
Foreign Emoluments Clause. 50 In this regard, we apply the fiduciary duty
of loyalty to conduct that would align with that standard, and we draw a
contrast to conduct that would fall short of that standard.
When making decisions in an official capacity, a President must do
so with a singular goal in mind: the best interests of the nation. When a
President’s undisclosed, private business affairs are entangled with
foreign nations, the public may reasonably be concerned that policy
choices are based upon on what is best for the President’s private interests,
or indebtedness to a foreign government, or what is in that foreign
government’s best interests. 51

48. See Jersey City. v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 591 (1955) (observing that civil law may provide a
remedy for public corruption even when criminal does not). See also, Applicability of 18 U.S.C. §
219 to Retired Foreign Service Officers, 11 Op. O.L.C. 67, 68 n. 2 (1987) (concluding that not all
conduct that violates the Emoluments Clause falls within the criminal proscription of § 219).
49. Lenhoff, supra note 26 at 215. Indeed, the constructive trust may prove to be an even more
effective remedy than either impeachment or prosecution because it is “[a] sanction which divests a
dishonest official of his ill-gotten rewards” and consequently “cuts the heart out of his enterprise.” Id.
50. Although the same principles apply to the Domestic Emoluments Clause, we limit our
discussion to the Foreign Emoluments Clause in light of space considerations.
51. Complaint at 41, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00458
(S.D.N.Y.
filed
June
14,
2017)
http://guptawessler.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/MembersofCongress.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QDU9-G653]
(citing
Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Nongovernment Members of ACUS, 17 Op. O.L.C. 114,
122 (1993) (commenting on the enduring wisdom of the Clause’s central insight: that our leaders
“might be biased, and [their] loyalty divided, if they received financial benefits from a foreign
government.”)). Similarly, the Domestic Emoluments Clause was adopted to ensure that the
President’s loyalty remained devoted to the best interests of the union and that his judgment in that
regard would not be tainted by “pecuniary inducement[s]” that would turn the presidency into “a
position of both power and profit.” Complaint at 43, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v.
Trump (quoting Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 137 (D.D.C. 1975), rev’d by Reporters Comm.
for Freedom of the Press v. Sampson, 591 F.2d 944 (D.D.C 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The Foreign Emoluments Clause exists precisely to address such
concerns. By requiring a President to secure congressional consent before
accepting an emolument from a foreign government, the Foreign
Emoluments Clause operates on an underlying premise that Congress
itself will operate in good faith and undertake the necessary
investigations—openly and transparently—to determine whether it
should grant or withhold consent. A President who meets the strict duty
of loyalty called for under fiduciary principles would ensure that he
conducts public business transparently, and without conflicts of interest,
that he obtain the consent of Congress before accepting a foreign
emolument, and that he cooperate with Congress in its efforts to determine
whether to allow a given emolument. In practice, this means that a
President should release his tax returns, divest himself of potentially
problematic holdings, make use of blind trusts, follow the advice of ethics
experts, 52 submit formal requests to Congress (and wait for approval)
before accepting any emolument from a foreign government, and dispose
of any emolument already in his possession in the manner prescribed by
Congress. 53
Indeed, in efforts to comply with the emoluments clauses, past
presidents have released their tax returns, divested themselves of
potentially problematic holdings, made use of blind trusts, obtained and
relied upon advice from the Office of Government Ethics (OGE), sought
congressional consent to accept foreign emoluments, and followed
congressional direction in disposing of any foreign emolument already in
the President’s possession. 54
If, instead of following these past practices, a President were to defy
all of them (as Trump is alleged to have done), 55 then the public would

52. In this regard, the non-partisan Office of Government Ethics has, for decades, offered legal
advice to help Presidents avoid conflicts of interest, including any that may arise as a result of business
entanglements (whether foreign or domestic) or other transactions that may implicate the Emoluments
Clauses so that the President can, if necessary, obtain congressional approval, decline an emolument,
or divest himself from problematic business holdings.
53. Complaint at 32-33, Blumenthal, et al. v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-01154 (D.D.C. filed June
14,
https://www.theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/
2017)
Blumenthal_v_Trump_DDC_Original_Complaint_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FFP-3HBW].
54. Id. (noting that in cases where Presidents have declined acceptance of gifts from foreign
states, Congress has instructed that the gifts be sold and the proceeds deposited in the Department of
the Treasury, or that the gifts themselves be conveyed to an appropriate governmental repository).
55. See, e.g., Complaint at 5, 12, 14, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump;
Complaint at 42, District of Columbia & State of Maryland v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM
(D.Md. filed June 12, 2017) https://ia800101.us.archive.org/13/items/gov.uscourts.mdd.391534/
gov.uscourts.mdd.391534.1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H9C-3SCH]; Complaint at 19, Blumenthal, et
al. v. Trump.
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have good reason to ask in whose interests he acted when he exercised the
vast authority of his office. 56 In such a case, the public would be more
than justified in concluding that at best the President’s loyalty is divided,
and that at worst he is, at the expense of the public weal, either profiting
personally or advancing the interests of a foreign government, or both.
A President’s acceptance of foreign emoluments without obtaining
the consent of Congress raises troubling questions about his willingness
to be bound by constitutional requirements and his commitment to the rule
of law. It also fails to comply with the fiduciary duty of strict loyalty to
act solely in the nation’s best interests. Accordingly, if demonstrated to
have violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause, a President should be held
to account. The violation may not constitute a crime, and it may not give
rise to the political will necessary to impeach, but such a fiduciary breach
should not go unaddressed. For retrospective violations that involve selfdealing, the imposition of a constructive trust would be a justifiable
remedy for the failure to meet the public official’s fiduciary duty of
loyalty owed to the public he ostensibly serves.57
VI. CONCLUSION
Given that fiduciary duties from the law of trusts animated the
structure and provisions of the Constitution, given that those same duties
find expression in the public trust doctrine, and given that the imposition
of a constructive trust is the remedy for violating fiduciary duties in both
the law of trusts and in cases involving public officials who have violated
their fiduciary duties, it becomes eminent that an appropriate remedy in a
successful Emoluments Clause case against a President, were any plaintiff
to survive pre-trial challenges and prevail upon the merits, would be the
imposition of a constructive trust. As an equitable remedy, the
constructive trust falls within the ambit of the inherent judicial authority.
It matters not that a President’s receipt of foreign emoluments steers clear
of raiding the public till. Courts may nevertheless reach the profits of gains
obtained by self-dealing in violation of the core fiduciary standards
attached to public office. Accordingly, a court finding violation of the
Foreign Emoluments Clause could order disgorgement of the profits a
President has realized while in office, and, to the extent they are no longer

56. Complaint at 10-11, District of Columbia & State of Maryland v. Trump.
57. We note that a constructive trust offers greater deterrent force than an injunction against
future violations, and that an additional remedy worth considering as a mechanism for preventing
prospective violations by a wayward President is a judicially imposed and administered blind trust.
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in his possession, the gains can be traced to third parties and restitution
ordered if not in the hands of bona fide purchasers.
As for the specific cases brought against Donald Trump, courts may
perhaps be reluctant to order even such a well-worn remedy in such
politically charged circumstances. Furthermore, the extent of foreign and
domestic holdings and the opacity of Trump’s business structure would
make identifying and tracing emoluments an exceedingly complex
undertaking, and one that would be an enormous drain on judicial
resources. A court could—and likely would—appoint a special master to
oversee and administer such matters as courts do have a long and
successful record of disentangling complex business structures and
complex financial transactions. Still, courts are not infrequently hesitant
to be the first to extend existing remedies to new contexts, even when well
within their power to do so.
Regardless, possible judicial reticence should not be taken to mean
that no alternate means are available for the imposition of a constructive
trust. Congress may also have power to enact legislation to provide for
remedies of a President’s violations of the Emoluments Clauses (foreign
and domestic). Whether and to what extent Congress has such power,
including what form such a statute might take, are questions that are ripe
for investigation but beyond the scope of this paper. Further beyond the
scope of this paper is whether, if Congress has such power, legislating
what is a traditionally equitable remedy would be desirable. Certainly, it
would seem that, in light of statutes such as the Foreign Gifts and
Decorations Act, 58 Congress does possess such power—at least for
prospective violations—and even though the Foreign Gifts Act does not
establish a constructive trust as a remedy, Congress likely could codify it
as such, or could embolden the courts by expressly authorizing the judicial
branch to consider constructive trusts as the remedy for Emoluments
Clause violations.

58. The Foreign Gifts Act, which operates as an exception to the otherwise “absolute ban” of
the Foreign Emoluments Clause, covers federal employees and permits them to accept basic lodging,
travel originating and ending outside the United States, meals, and gifts of “minimal value.” Jeffrey
Green, Application of the Emoluments Clause to Department of Defense Civilian Employees and
Military Personnel, 2013 Army Law. 15, 16 (2013). Accord 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (2012).

